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Abstract
Limited liability debt ﬁnancing of irreversible investments can aﬀect investment timing
through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected de-
fault losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment
opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that is enhanced
in a straightforward manner to include the equilibrium eﬀect of a competitive lending sec-
tor. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of
debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the
lower tail of risks, thereby lowering the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for
expected default losses reduces project proﬁtability to the entrepreneur, thereby increasing
the investment threshold. The net eﬀect is negative, because lower downside risk has an
additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in
real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an
investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule.
Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.1 Introduction
The Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) guarantees that the mix of debt and internal ﬁnancing
does not aﬀect the overall value of a ﬁrm, or as is the case in this paper, the overall value
of an investment project. It implies that a ﬁnancing decision cannot be used to increase the
overall value of a project, and therefore, it obviates theoretical arguments about any role
of debt ﬁnancing in an investment decision.2 In practice, debt ﬁnancing appears to play a
signiﬁcant role in investment decisions; for example, aggregate debt growth rates are well-
known to be pro-cyclical for both households and ﬁrms, there is a literature on the role of
debt ﬁnancing on real estate construction decisions, there is another literature on the eﬀects
of ﬁnancing on ﬁrm decisions, and there is a further literature on the role of debt ﬁnancing
on household ﬁnancial decision-making.
Exceptions to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, including explanations for its observed vio-
lations, usually rely on some form of market imperfection, including tax distortions, agency
costs, market power, other deadweight losses, and so on.
This paper presents another exception to the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Using ideas
regarding value of waiting that have been formalized in real options theory, it is shown that
if an investment option resides with an entrepreneur, (as opposed to a lender,) then even
after compensating a lender for expected default losses, limited liability debt ﬁnancing aﬀects
optimal investment timing by aﬀecting an entrepreneur’s value of waiting.3 In particular,
with such debt ﬁnancing, the optimal investment threshold is lower than that consistent
2The well-known result by Merton (1977) shows the validity of the Modigliani-Miller theorem even with
a positive probability of bankruptcy, an application of this theorem to Arrow-Debreu economies is given in
Stiglitz (1969), and another application to open market operations is given in Wallace (1981).
3For a development of real options theory, see the seminal papers by McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck
(1988), Dixit (1989), and others. More recent work is presented in the collection by Brennan and Trige-
orgis (2000). For generalizations to non-Gaussian processes, see Boyarchenko and Levendorsk˘ i (2000), and
Boyarchenko (2003).
1with the standard theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty, but higher than cost
of investment. Therefore, whereas the classical NPV rule of investment (invest at the ﬁrst
time when present value exceeds cost of investment) does not consider the value of waiting for
new information, and gives a threshold that is too low, the standard NPV rule of irreversible
investment under uncertainty (invest at the ﬁrst time when present value exceeds a multiple
of investment cost) does not consider the eﬀect of limited liability on the value of waiting,
and gives a threshold that is too high.
Consider an entrepreneur who ﬁnances an investment cost I with debt D · I using a
simple, limited liability debt contract.4 The lender has a ﬁrst claim on project revenues
up to a ﬁxed coupon C, determined by the lender’s zero proﬁt condition. If revenue is
below C, the entrepreneur’s liability is limited to available revenue, and she turns over
the entire revenue to the lender. In this case, there are several eﬀects of debt ﬁnancing
on the optimal investment threshold. To the extent that debt reduces an entrepreneur’s
share of investment cost, the investment threshold is lower, and to the extent that limited
liability lowers downside risk of the project, the investment threshold is lower. But default
is not costless, because the lender anticipates its probability, and sets coupon in part to
oﬀset expected losses. To the extent a higher coupon decreases project proﬁtability for
4The analysis here does not explicitly consider a reason for debt ﬁnancing, but takes the decision about
debt as given, assumes that the entrepreneur can ﬁnance the remainder from either an endowment, or
equivalently, from existing internal funds, and focuses on the eﬀect of debt on the optimal investment
threshold. In particular, a priori, there is no guarantee that optimal debt is not zero. The debt contract
assumed here is a reduced-form of the simple debt contract that is optimal in the costly state veriﬁcation
(CSV) model of Townsend (1979). In a more recent paper, Krasa and Villamil (2000) show that among
other things, the CSV model can be thought of as a reduced-form of a more fundamental model with limited
committment and with costly enforcement as a decision variable, and in such a model, simple debt remains an
optimal contract. Qualitative eﬀects of alternative limited liability debt contracts are the same, as described
below.
2the entrepreneur, the investment threshold is higher. Moreover, a lower default probability
decreases coupon, increases project proﬁtability for the entrepreneur, and therefore, lowers
the investment threshold, and similarly, a higher default probability raises coupon, reduces
project proﬁtability, and raises the threshold. What might be the net eﬀect of such debt
ﬁnancing on the optimal investment threshold? Intuitively, one might expect that after
compensating the lender for expected default losses, its net eﬀect is zero. In contrast, the
analysis here shows that the net eﬀect is not zero; in fact, it is negative.
The non-neutrality of debt can be viewed in terms of a skewed evaluation of a mean-
preserving spread in an entrepreneur’s option value. Recall that option value derives in part
from an ability to avoid downside risk; that is, in case of adverse realizations, an option
does not have to be exercised, and therefore, other things equal, if downside risk of a project
is lower, (its option value is lower, and) its investment threshold is lower. With limited
liability, some of the downside risk is transferred to the lender, and from an entrepreneur’s
viewpoint, the lower tail of risks is truncated. This has two eﬀects — one on project value,
and the other on option value. The mean-preserving aspect arises from the lender’s zero
proﬁt condition, and it implies an equal and opposite impact on total project value. The
skewed evaluation arises from an additional impact of the truncation of the lower tail of risks
on the entrepreneur’s option value. Limited liability reduces downside risk, and this has an
additional negative impact on an entrepreneur’s option value, thus lowering the investment
threshold.
The formal analysis in this paper is based on a straightforward extension of a simple
version of a well-established model (Pindyck (1988), and McDonald and Siegel (1986)) of
irreversible investment to include a competitive lending sector, and it yields a closed-form
solution for the optimal investment threshold.5 A unique feature of this analysis is the intro-
5As mentioned in Pindyck (1991), examples of irreversible investments include investments that are
speciﬁc to a ﬁrm or industry, (for example, a large, industry-speciﬁc production unit,) investments the resale
3duction of a lending sector, and consequently, an endogenous determination of the coupon
or interest rate on debt based on the equilibrium feedback from the lending sector. An
appealing feature of this analysis is that it provides an equilibrium solution that is unique,
analytically tractable, and intuitive. The equilibrium solution allows a natural decompo-
sition of the optimal threshold into two parts, one that can be compared directly to the
standard model of irreversible investment under uncertainty, and another that arises from
the introduction of debt ﬁnancing, thereby facilitating a better understanding of the impact
of debt ﬁnancing on optimal investment thresholds.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the model, deﬁnes an equilibrium, and
shows the existence of a unique equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the new NPV rule, and
relates it to some established notions in the theory of investment under uncertainty.
2 Speciﬁcation of the Model
The model in this paper adapts a simple version of a well-established model (Pindyck (1988),
and McDonald and Siegel (1986)) of irreversible investment to include a competitive lending
sector. To facilitate comparison to the standard model, notation from Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) is used. Suppose, as usual, that an entrepreneur is considering an irreversible invest-
ment in a project with a ﬁxed scale, inﬁnite life, and no marginal cost. If inverse demand for
project output is P = Y ¢D(Q), where P is price of the ﬁrm’s output, Q is quantity of output,
and Y a stochastic shift variable, then ﬁxing Q = 1 allows P to be the stochastic variable,
and P follows a geometric brownian motion with drift, given by dP = ®Pdt + ¾PdW. Let
¹ be the discount rate for future revenues, and let ± = ¹ ¡ ® > 0.
The cost of investment is I. The investment is irreversible, in the sense that the invest-
of which involve informational asymmetries, and investments that cannot be divested because of government
or institutional restrictions.
4ment cost is sunk, once it is incurred, but this can be relaxed with a disinvestment cost, as
explained below. For convenience, there is no depreciation or time-to-build, and once the
investment cost is incurred, the project yields a unit ﬂow of output forever. The entrepreneur
ﬁnances this project with the following limited liability debt contract. If an entrepreneur
desires debt D · I,6 then in exchange for D, he agrees to give the lender a ﬁrst claim on
project revenues up to a ﬁxed coupon C, determined by the lender. If revenue is below
C, the entrepreneur’s liability is limited to available revenue, and he turns over the entire
revenue to the lender. There is no beneﬁt from selling the project, because the investment
is irreversible, and therefore, the lender does not foreclose the project when revenue is below
coupon, and the project continues to produce output forever.
The lender knows the project’s price process, and output is observable. The lender has
access to funds at the risk-free rate r. For example, we may think of a lender as a bank
with access to consumer deposits. The lender cannot directly invest in the project; it is only
the entrepreneur that has an opportunity to invest.7 The lending sector is competitive, so
that in equilibrium, the coupon set by the lender oﬀsets the expected loss to the lender from
6As mentioned above, this analysis takes the debt decision as given, and focuses on the eﬀect of debt on
the optimal investment threshold. An entrepreneur might decide to utilize debt for several reasons: perhaps
investment cost is large and cannot be ﬁnanced by savings or retained earnings, or perhaps there is a ﬁrst-
mover advantage and quick entry into a project might yield some monopoly rents, or perhaps there is a tax
advantage for using debt, or perhaps debt is relatively cheaper in times of expansionary monetary policy.
See also, for example, Lambrecht (2001), Mello and Parsons (1992), and Mauer and Triantis (1994). In
particular, this paper does not consider the problem of optimal capital structure, for example, in the spirit of
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), (including extensions to real options by Mauer and Ott (2000),
and by Nachman (2003),) Brander and Lewis (1986), Brander and Lewis (1988), Leland (1994), and Leland
and Toft (1996), and others.
7For example, an entrepreneur might have a monopoly right, such as a patent, or she might have some
specialized knowledge to produce a particular output, or a bank might be prohibited by law from equity
investment in a project.
5future default, and the net value of the project to the lender is zero.8
The entrepreneur’s problem is mathematically the same as in a simple version of Pindyck
(1988).9 The entrepreneur’s proﬁt ﬂow is given by ¼E(C;P) = max(P ¡ C;0). For ﬁxed C,






B1P ¯1 + B2P ¯2 + P
± ¡ C
r if P ¸ C; and
K1P ¯1 + K2P ¯2 if P < C:
The terms ¯1 > 1 and ¯2 < 0 are solutions to the quadratic equation 1
2¾2¯(¯ ¡ 1) + (r ¡
±)¯ ¡ r = 0, and the terms B1P ¯1 and K2P ¯2 are related to speculative bubbles, which are
ruled out by assumption, implying that B1 = 0 and K2 = 0. Standard value matching and






















Notice that B2 is a function of C. When convenient, the dependence of B2 on C is denoted
B2(C).
For P ¸ C, the value of the project to the entrepreneur is the expected present value of
capitalized revenues P
± minus the capitalized value of the sure coupon ﬂow C
r adjusted for
his beneﬁt from future default when revenue is below coupon, given by B2P ¯2.
The entrepreneur has an option to delay investment, if he so chooses. For ﬁxed debt D and
coupon C, the entrepreneur’s problem is to determine the revenue threshold (or equivalently,
the demand threshold) that maximizes the value of this project to him, and he invests at the
8The model is described for the case of a risk-neutral entrepreneur and lender. Alternatively, using a
standard change-of-measure, the results here are true with the same degree of risk-aversion for both an
entrepreneur and a lender.
9This formulation is well-known, and is presented in Pindyck (1991), and in Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
chapter 6, as a model in which a ﬁrm can costlessly suspend and resume operations. This paper presents a
diﬀerent application of that model, and therefore, details are presented here both for completeness, and to
aid appropriate interpretation of that model.
6ﬁrst time when revenue (or demand) crosses this threshold. For ﬁxed C and D, the value of
his option to invest in this project, denoted F(P), is given by F(P) = A1P ¯1 + A2P ¯2. The








¤); and (3) F(0) = 0:
Consequently, the optimal threshold P satisﬁes
(¯1 ¡ ¯2)B2P







+ I ¡ D
¶
= 0:
Notice that, for ﬁxed C and D, the entrepreneur’s problem is mathematically the same as
the one in which there is a ﬁxed operating cost C, cost of investment I ¡D, and operations
that can be costlessly suspended and resumed. In that interpretation, B2P ¯2 is the expected
present value to the entrepreneur from costlessly suspending operations when revenue falls
below cost.
In the formulation in this paper, the project continues to operate even when revenue
is below coupon, but the entrepreneur’s proﬁt is zero, because revenue is turned over to
the lender. Therefore, B2P ¯2 is the expected present value to the entrepreneur from not
having to pay coupon when revenue falls below coupon; in other words, it is the value to
the entrepreneur from defaulting when revenue falls below coupon. Default correspondingly
reduces the value of the project to the lender. In this paper, the term B2P ¯2 denotes the
default value of a project. In equilibrium, default is not costless, because the lender sets
coupon to oﬀset the default value of a project, as shown below.
Applying a well-known result by Pindyck (1988), for ﬁxed C and I ¡D, the entrepreneur
will invest only when P > C, and the equation for his optimal threshold has a unique solution
for P, where P > C.
The lender’s problem is formulated as follows. The lender’s proﬁt ﬂow is given by
¼L(C;P) = min(C;P). For ﬁxed C, the value of this project to the lender evolves with







1 P ¯1 + BL
2 P ¯2 + C
r if P ¸ C; and
KL
1 P ¯1 + KL
2 P ¯2 + P
± if P < C:
As above, the terms ¯1 > 1 and ¯2 < 0 are solutions to the quadratic equation 1
2¾2¯(¯ ¡
1) + (r ¡ ±)¯ ¡ r = 0, and the terms BL
1 P ¯1 and KL
2 P ¯2 are associated with speculative
bubbles, which are ruled out by assumption, implying that BL
1 = 0 and KL
2 = 0.10 The value
matching and smooth pasting conditions with respect to P imply (at P = C),
BL
2 C¯2 = KL
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For P ¸ C, the value of the project to the lender is the capitalized value of the sure
coupon ﬂow C
r adjusted for the expected loss in present value from default BL
2 P ¯2. In other
words, if the lender sets coupon C, and price is P, the expected present value of this project
to the lender is C
r ¡ B2P ¯2. Because the entrepreneur invests only when P ¸ C, the zero
proﬁt condition for the lender is
0 = V
L ¡ D =
C
r
¡ D ¡ B2P
¯2:
Thus, for ﬁxed D and P, the lender chooses coupon to cover both the debt extended, and
its expected losses from future default.11
10When P is very large, default probability is very low, implying that the value of the project to the lender
is close to C
r , and therefore BL













, and this makes the lender strictly prefer to remain in the project when the entrepreneur
8Notice that independent of the deﬁnition of equilibrium given below, the total value of
an already-in-place project, that is, the sum of the value of the project to the entrepreneur
and to the lender, is V = V F + V L = P
± . In the theory of investment under uncertainty,
V = P
± is the fundamental value of a project, and for a continuing project, it is unaﬀected
by the choice of debt level. This follows from frictionless debt markets, and in this narrow
sense, for a continuing project, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in this model.
For a given debt level, the investment problem is to determine a coupon level and a
price level that simultaneously satisfy both the optimality condition for the entrepreneur and
the zero proﬁt condition for the lender. The discussion above suggests the following deﬁnition
of an equilibrium. For a given debt level D · I, an equilibrium for the investment problem
is a pair (C¤;P ¤) such that C¤ · P ¤,








r ¡ D ¡ B2(C¤)(P ¤)¯2 = 0:
The following theorem shows that the investment problem is well-deﬁned.
Theorem 1. There is a non-empty, open interval (0; ¯ D) ½ [0;I], such that for every D¤ 2
(0; ¯ D), there is a unique equilibrium (C¤;P ¤) to the investment problem.









and g(C;D) = C









, so that lim
C!0
C
P(C;D) = 0 (independently of D). Therefore,





















defaults. Moreover, in case of default, a variable cost of disinvestment equal to K1P¯1 + ², for any ² > 0,
again makes the lender strictly prefer to not disinvest. A more detailed analysis would reveal these bounds
to be upper bounds for disinvestment cost, because a new entrepreneur would also have some option value,
and therefore, he would accept this project only at a fraction of the project’s expected present value.
9Notice that when viewed as a function of D, the left hand side of the inequality above is an
increasing function and is bounded away from zero, so there is a non-empty open interval






















The last condition is equivalent to g(Co;D¤) > 0. Moreover, g(0;D¤) = ¡D¤ < 0. As g is
continuous, there is C¤ · Co such that g(C¤;D¤) = 0. Let P ¤ = P(C¤;D¤). Then for debt
level D¤, (C¤;P ¤) is an equilibrium.
To verify uniqueness, suppose for debt level D, (C1;P1) and (C2;P2) are two equilibria.
Without loss of generality, suppose C1 · C2. If C1 < C2, then P1 > P2, so that the
entrepreneur strictly prefers the lower coupon C1, and thus (C2;P2) is not an equilibrium.
Therefore, C1 = C2, whence P1 = P2.
3 The Non-Neutrality of Debt: A New NPV Rule
The results in the previous section show that at debt level D, the equilibrium investment















that is, an entrepreneur invests at the ﬁrst time when total expected present value of the
project ((V F)¤ + (V L)¤ = V ¤ = P¤
± , given on the left-hand side of the equality) exceeds the
right-hand side of the equality.
In the basic model of irreversible investment under uncertainty, the standard NPV rule
for the investment threshold V ¤ is given by the term
¯1








< 0. (Notice that ¯1 > 1, ¯2 < 0, and C¤
r ¡ D > 0.)
The new rule shows that the presence of any debt lowers the investment threshold from that
consistent with the standard NPV rule.
10Does the presence of debt lead to an investment threshold lower than investment cost? In
the model here, the investment threshold is always greater than investment cost. Therefore,
the value of waiting is always positive. To compare the new investment threshold with






This is because g(¢;D) is concave everywhere (
@2g
@C2 < 0), so it has at most two zeros, and the
proof of the theorem above shows that the smaller of the two zeros is an equilibrium. As





(C¤;D) ¸ 0. The following lemma characterizes when
@g
@C ¸ 0.






























































































from which the desired conclusion follows.
The following theorem shows that the optimal present value threshold is greater than in-
vestment cost, but less than the standard prescription of the theory of irreversible investment
under uncertainty.








Proof. The ﬁrst inequality holds, because the condition in the previous lemma is equivalent
to C¤




























¡ D > ¡
1
¯1 ¡ 1
D ¡ D +
¯1
¯1 ¡ 1
I > I ¡ D:
The second inequality is obvious.
The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing arises from the entrepreneur’s option
value. This can be seen by re-writing the entrepreneur’s optimality condition as
(¯1 ¡ 1)P
± = ¯1 (I ¡ D) + ¯1
¡
C
r ¡ B2(C)P ¯2¢
+ ¯2B2(C)P ¯2
= ¯1 (I ¡ D) + ¯1V L(C;P) + ¯2B2(C)P ¯2:
The investment threshold is aﬀected by three components — the entrepreneur’s share of
invesment cost, I ¡ D, the value of the project that goes to the lender, V L(C;P), and an
additional impact of limited liability on the downside risk of a project, B2(C)P ¯2. Increases
in the entrepreneur’s share of investment cost increase the threshold, increases in the lender’s
share of project value reduce the entrepreneur’s share and increase the threshold, and in-
creases in the additional impact of limited liability on downside risk lower the threshold.
The lender’s zero proﬁt condition implies that the reduction in the entrepreneur’s share of
investment cost is oﬀset exactly by the value of the project that goes to the lender, and the
additional impact from a reduction in downside risk aﬀorded by limited liability lowers the
invesment threshold from that consistent with the standard case.
It is important to note that this non-neutrality arises from an entrepreneur’s unique
investment opportunity. If the lender makes the investment decision, then debt is neutral,
and the standard result applies. More generally, in cases where the lender has some inﬂuence
over the entrepreneur’s exercise decision, one would expect a partial eﬀect on investment
thresholds. In studying diﬀerent industries with varying lender inﬂuence, this implies a
compositional eﬀect of investment thresholds.
This non-neutrality can be motivated in terms of a “bad news principle” (Bernanke
(1983)). In the standard theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty, the value of
12waiting arises from an optimal trade-oﬀ between the cost of lost revenue from a postponed
investment, and the beneﬁt from postponing an irreversible cost in the presence of adverse
demand shocks. In the presence of limited liability debt ﬁnancing, waiting is valuable, but not
as much as it is in the standard case, essentially because “bad news” or adverse realizations
after investment are marginally less costly for the ﬁrm.12
To facilitate a numerical comparison to the standard NPV rule, consider the following
parameter values.13 A unit of time is one year, the risk-free rate is two percent (r = 0:02),
uncertainty, as measured by volatility, is twenty percent (¾ = 0:20), the opportunity cost
of waiting (also referred to as a convenience yield or proportional dividend yield) is three
percent (± = 0:03), and the investment cost is normalized to I = 100. For the standard
NPV rule, these parameter values yield a threshold that is twice investment cost. As shown
in Figure 1, for all D > 0, the new NPV rule is lower than the standard NPV rule, and this
diﬀerence increases when a greater fraction of investment cost is debt-ﬁnanced. If we consider
a debt-to-investment cost ratio of 50 percent,14 then the overstatement of the standard NPV
rule is about 6 percent, with debt ﬁnancing at 80 percent, it is about 17 percent, and this
overstatement can be as much as 30 or 35 percent for higher debt levels.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
12For a continuing project, at the intensive margin, there is a standard eﬀect of uncertainty on project
value, both to the entrepreneur and to the lender, and in this paper, this eﬀect for each player is equal but
in the opposite direction, but on the extensive margin, debt plays an additional role aﬀecting option value.
13These parameter values are mentioned in McDonald and Siegel (1986) and in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
14For the nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate sector in the United States, the ratio of debt to tangible assets
was about 45 percent during the period 1990-2001, and the ratio of debt minus commercial paper to tangible
assets minus inventories was about 50 percent over the same period. These ﬁgures would give lower estimates
for debt ﬁnancing on a representative new project, because debt amortizes over the life of the loan, whereas
the investment cost is measured at replacement cost. Other researchers have mentioned lower numbers for
debt ﬁnancing; for example, see Gomes (2001).
13The investment threshold implied by the new NPV rule compares to those implied by
Tobin’s q or Jorgenson’s user cost of capital in a manner similar to that implied by the
standard NPV rule.
Let q be the ratio of the value of a new project to its investment cost. The investment
threshold in the spirit of Tobin (1969) would be given by q¤ = 1. In contrast, the theorem
above shows that V ¤ = P¤
± > I, so q should be adjusted to q¤ = V ¤
I > 1, similar to that
implied by the standard NPV rule. Moreover, the q threshold implied by the new NPV rule
is obviously lower than that implied by the standard NPV rule.
Similarly, for debt level D, if the interest rate on D is i, then i is given by iD = C¤.
Therefore, for debt level D, the user cost of capital is given by rI¡D
I + iD
I . Following
Jorgenson (1963), let the investment threshold for a new project be that price where price
per unit of investment cost equals the user cost of capital. It is well-known that in the partial
equilibrium investment model of a ﬁrm with ﬁxed operating costs C, cost of investment I,
and costless suspension and resumption of operations, the optimal investment threshold is
greater than rI + C. In the model in this paper, this translates to P ¤ > r(I ¡ D) + C¤. As












I is greater than the user cost of capital, so that the new NPV rule implies an optimal
investment threshold greater than the user cost of capital. This threshold is again lower than
that implied by the standard NPV rule.
Alternative limited liability debt contracts yield the same qualitative results. Deﬁne a
limited liability debt contract as one that limits the liability of the entrepreneur when he
cannot pay coupon, so that there is some present value beneﬁt to the entrepreneur (and the
same present value loss to the lender) from future default. Consider a particular limited
liability debt contract in which coupon is not zero. The dynamics of geometric brownian
motion guarantee that the probability of revenue falling below coupon sometime in the future
14is positive, and limited liability then guarantees some present value beneﬁt to the ﬁrm (and
the same present value loss to the lender) from future default. For a ﬁxed coupon C and
revenue P, denote this beneﬁt by »(C;P). A natural (and fairly weak) assumption on the
default beneﬁt is that it is decreasing in revenue — the higher is P, the lower is probability
of default, and hence the lower is present value beneﬁt from future default. Therefore,
suppose »P(C;P) < 0. In this case, the value of the project to the entrepreneur can be
written as P
± ¡ C







¡¯1»(C;P)+P»P(C;P). In equilibrium, the lender chooses coupon so that
C
r ¡D = »(C;P), and therefore, the optimal threshold satisﬁes (¯1¡1)P
± = ¯1I+P»P(C;P),
again conﬁrming the non-neutrality of debt, (because equilibrium C depends on D,) and a
lower investment threshold than that prescribed by the standard NPV rule.
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Figure 1: Comparative Statics of Debt Financing
Parameter values are ﬁxed at r = :02, ¾ = 0:20, ± = 0:03, and I = 100.
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